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摘  要 
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The dissertation aims to study how executive incentive and risk perception affect 
the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms. The capital structure theory believes that 
appropriate leverage ratio is beneficial for improvement of corporate value. In recent 
years, however, the phenomenon of low-leverage or even zero-leverage has emerged as 
a growing trend of internationalization which is called "zero leverage puzzle". Current 
literature has pay attention to the zero-leverage puzzle, which is attributed to financial 
constraint, financial flexibility, corporate governance and macro environment based on 
capital structure theories. However, both current theories and literature cannot give a 
rational explanation for why the phenomenon of zero-leverage exists. Therefore, the 
dissertation discusses the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms from the aspects of 
executive incentive and risk perception. 
Based on the analysis of institutional background of the supply and demand of 
capital, banking is still the main channel of the corporate external financing in China. 
There has being some gradual reform in terms of interest rate, business, product and so 
on. Banking confront with increasing capital competition and more intensive customer 
battle. Moreover, listed companies are always excellent enterprises because of rigorous 
market admission mechanism and the guidance of professional organizations. And 
listing qualification of companies can bring other financial services besides banking to 
banks, and reduce the banks’ risk lending to post-IPO companies, which can improve 
the borrowers’ ability to gain loan. The dissertation tends to believe that the institutional 
background in Chinese capital market makes it possible for listed firms to choose zero-
leverage proactively. 
The executives of companies which own decision-making rights play a crucial role 
in the zero-leverage behavior of listed firms, and the incentive and risk perception of 















expectancy theory and loss aversion theory, the dissertation discusses the determinants 
of zero-leverage behavior of listed firms, which including equity incentive and liquidity 
risk perception in non-SOEs, promotion incentive and related risk perception in SOEs. 
Moreover, the relationship above is affected by the change of macro environment, such 
as monetary policy, anti-corruption case and the implementation of pay ceiling order. 
The dissertation also discusses the consequences of zero-leverage behavior. The main 
findings are as follows. Both insufficient incentive and high risk perception are 
important determinants of zero-leverage behavior. And the relationship above is 
affected by monetary policy, anti-corruption case and the implementation of pay ceiling 
order. The dissertation takes robustness tests through changing variables, samples, 
regression methods and so on. The results are robust. In addition, zero-leverage 
behavior of listed companies is a persistent phenomenon in China. The choice and 
persistence of zero-leverage can affect the investment efficiency and firm performance，
and the relationship above changs with the marketization of the regions. 
The dissertation will help to understand the mystery of zero-leverage and low-
leverage, and rethink current capital structure theories. 
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第一章  绪论 
1 











通策医疗（600763）在 1999-2014 年间连续 16 年保持有息债务率为 0，在 1999-
2015 年间连续 17 年保持短期有息债务率为 0，在 1996-2014 年间连续 19 年保持
长期有息债务率为 0；华北高速（000916）在 2002-2013 年间连续 12 年保持零有
息负债状态，在 2002-2013 年间连续 12 年保持零短期有息负债状态，在 1999-
2013 年间连续 15 年保持零长期有息负债状态。从整体来看，2008-2014 年间，
零负债企业占 A 股上市公司的比重为 8.56%，国企中零负债企业占比 4.6%，民
企中零负债企业占比 11.80%。分年度看，我国资本市场 A 股上市公司采取零有
息负债策略的企业占比从 2008 年的 4.19%增至 2011 年的 11.21%，尔后降至 2014
年的 7.21%；采取低有息负债策略1的企业占比从 2008 年的 7.64%增至 2011 年的
16.03%，尔后降至 2014 年的 11.86%（详见图 1.1）。而且，2008-2014 年间我国
A 股企业的零负债行为具有一定的持续性，最多连续 7 年采取零负债策略。可
见，我国资本市场普遍存在着这种特殊的零负债现象。 
而且，这一现象已被证明广泛存在于美国（Lee 和 Moon，2011）、英国（Chen






































































图 1.1 我国上市公司零负债（近零负债）企业占比的变化趋势图2 
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